

CRYPTOGRAPHY

Part I: Public-Key Cryptography

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Information...


- 📌 has become a **valuable resource**
- 📌 is the **business model** of many companies (,  etc.)
- 📌 is nowadays almost always **digitalized**
 - allows for **easier use**, but also for **easier misuse**
- 📌 **needs to be protected**

Cryptography...

- is the **mathematical study** of info-protecting techniques
- provides **tools** for protecting information
- provides a **rigorous understanding** of
 - what **security** these tools **achieve**
 - what **security** these tools **do not achieve**
- is used **in daily life** by everybody – maybe unwittingly

Secure Communication

ALICE



Dear Bob
It was
.....
Alice

EVE



BOB



Solution: Encryption


ALICE



EVE



BOB



Solution: Encryption

ALICE



EVE




```
%&X*#0@i|  
g>n&a1Y?x  
+d#&1$S$Z)  
±*&I03@V.  
.....  
.....  
.....&$Q0*  
%h=#$I&X@
```

???

BOB




*Dear Bob
It was
Alice*



*Dear Bob
It was
Alice*

```
%&X*#0@i|  
g>n&a1Y?x  
+d#&1$S$Z)  
±*&I03@V.  
.....  
.....  
.....&$Q0*  
%h=#$I&X@
```



Solution: Encryption

ALICE



EVE



```
%&X*#0@i|  
g>n&a1Y?x  
+d#&1$$Z)  
±*&I03@V.  
.....  
.....  
.....&$Q0*  
%h=#$I&X@
```

???

BOB



Need:


1. Alice & Bob know




2. Eve does not know



*Dear Bob
It was
Alice*




*Dear Bob
It was
Alice*



```
%&X*#0@i|  
g>n&a1Y?x  
+d#&1$$Z)  
±*&I03@V.  
.....  
.....  
.....&$Q0*  
%h=#$I&X@
```

"Dictionary"



Dear Bob
It was
.....
Alice


= electronic file / data: $m \in \mathcal{M}$



= en- & decryption key: $k \in \mathcal{K}$



= encryption function/procedure: $E_k : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{C}$
with corresponding decryption function: E_k^{-1}



%&X*#0@i]
g>n&a1Y?x
+d#&1\$\$Z)
±*&IO3@V.
.....
.....
.....&\$Q0*
%h=#\$I&X@

= encrypted file (= ciphertext): $c = E_k(m)$

and: $m = E_k^{-1}(c)$

A (Even More) Mechanical View on Encryption

ALICE



*Dear Bob
It was
.....
Alice*



EVE



BOB



A (Even More) Mechanical View on Encryption

ALICE



EVE



???

BOB



Dear Bob
It was
.....
Alice



Need:

1. Alice & Bob know



2. Eve does not know



Problem

ALICE



Dear Bob
It was
.....
Alice

EVE



BOB



**But what if Alice & Bob have
no common secret key  ?**

Problem

ALICE



Dear Bob
It was
.....
Alice



EVE



BOB



But what if Alice & Bob have
no common secret key  ?

Sending the key from, e.g., Bob to Alice does
not work, since then Eve learns it as well...

A Mechanical Solution

ALICE



Dear Bob
It was
.....
Alice

EVE



BOB



A Mechanical Solution

ALICE



EVE



BOB



A Mechanical Solution

ALICE



EVE



???

BOB



*Dear Bob
It was
.....
Alice*



Towards a Digital Solution

ALICE



EVE



BOB




Two keys:


- a public-key to encrypt
- a **secret-key** to decrypt

*Dear Bob
It was
Alice*

*Dear Bob
It was
Alice*



%&X*#0@i|
g>n&a1Y?x
+d#&1\$\$Z)
±*&I03@V.
.....
.....
.....&\$Q0*
%h=#\$I&X@



%&X*#0@i|
g>n&a1Y?x
+d#&1\$\$Z)
±*&I03@V.
.....
.....
.....&\$Q0*
%h=#\$I&X@

Towards a Digital Solution

ALICE



Public Board:



Owner: BOB




EVE




BOB



*Dear Bob
It was
.....
Alice*



%&X*#0@i|
g>n&a1Y?x
+d#&1\$\$Z)
±*&I03@V.
.....
.....
.....&\$Q0*
%h=#\$I&X@



Towards a Digital Solution

ALICE



Public Board:



Owner: BOB



EVE




???

BOB




*Dear Bob
It was
.....
Alice*



*Dear Bob
It was
.....
Alice*

```
%&x*#0@i]
g>n&a1Y?x
+d#&1$$Z)
±*&I03@v.
.....
.....
.....&$Q0*
%h=#$I&x@
```



Towards a Digital Solution

ALICE



Public Board:



Owner: BOB



EVE



???

BOB



CHARLIE



*Dear Bob
It was
.....
Alice*



*Hi Bob
Let's
.....
Charlie*


*Dear Bob
It was
.....
Alice*

etc.



`#^n&a1Y?x
%&X*#0@i|
+d&I03@#&
1&*8I*?..
.....
.....
.....I&X@`

`%&X*#0@i|
g>n&a1Y?x
+d#&1$$Z)
±*&I03@V.
.....
.....
.....&$$Q0*
%h=#$I&X@`



In Technical Terms

We need:

Encryption function E_{pk} , which depends on public-key pk , such that when given pk (only):


1. **evaluating** $E_{pk}(m)$ (on any m) is “easy”, and
2. **inverting** E_{pk} , i.e., computing m from $E_{pk}(m)$, is “hard”.

With the help of a **trapdoor**, the secret-key sk , **inverting** E_{pk} becomes “easy”.


Is called a **trapdoor one-way function (TOWF)**.

An "Toy Example" of a TOWF


pk = English-to-Swahili dictionary
(i.e. with the English entries sorted)



sk = Swahili-to-English dictionary
(i.e. with the Swahili entries sorted)



$E_{pk}(m)$ = translation of (English text) m into Swahili


Given $pk =$  :

1. translating into Swahili (= computing $E_{pk}(m)$) is **easy**,
2. translating back into English (= inverting E_{pk}) is **hard**.

Yet with the help of , the latter becomes **easy**.

Some Maths: Modular Arithmetic

modulus



Formally: $a = b \pmod{n}$ if $a = b + k \cdot n$ for some k .

Examples: Set $n = 11$.

Why is this interesting?

- Numbers remain **bounded in size**
- Useful **structure**

- $4^3 = 4 \cdot 4 \cdot 4 = 16 \cdot 4 = 5 \cdot 4 = 20 = 9 \pmod{11}$

Some Maths: Fermat's Little Theorem

Let p be a prime number.

Theorem: For any number $a \neq 0$: $a^{p-1} = 1 \pmod{p}$.

Examples: Let $p = 5$ and $a = 3$. Then

$$\begin{aligned} 3^4 &= 3 \cdot 3 \cdot 3 \cdot 3 = 9 \cdot 3 \cdot 3 = 4 \cdot 3 \cdot 3 \\ &= 12 \cdot 3 = 2 \cdot 3 = 6 = 1 \pmod{5} \end{aligned}$$

Corollary: If $x = y \pmod{p-1}$, then for any a :

$$a^x = a^y \pmod{p}.$$

Proof: $x = y \pmod{p-1} \Rightarrow x = y + k \cdot (p-1)$

$$\Rightarrow a^x = a^{y+k \cdot (p-1)} = a^y \cdot (a^{p-1})^k = a^y \cdot 1^k = a^y \pmod{p}$$

Some Maths: Euler's Theorem

Let p be a **prime** number.

Theorem: For any number $a \neq 0$: $a^{p-1} = 1 \pmod{p}$.

Corollary: If $x = y \pmod{p-1}$, then for any a :

$$a^x = a^y \pmod{p}.$$

Let p and q be two distinct **prime** numbers.

Theorem: For any number $a \neq 0$: $a^{(p-1)(q-1)} = 1 \pmod{pq}$.

Corollary: If $x = y \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$, then for any a :

$$a^x = a^y \pmod{pq}.$$

A Real Example of a TWOF: RSA

Choose large (300-digits) prime numbers p and q .

Compute $n = pq$ (easy to do).

Let e be a (almost) arbitrary number, e.g. $e = 3$.

Set $pk = (n, e)$ and $sk = (p, q, e)$, and

$$E_{pk}(a) = a^e \pmod{n} \quad (\text{easy when given } pk).$$

Given $sk = (p, q, e)$, one can compute d such that

$$de = 1 \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)} \quad (\text{ext. Euclid alg.})$$

and then

$$E_{pk}(a)^d = (a^e)^d = a^{de} = a^1 = a \pmod{n}$$

A Real Example of a TWOF: RSA

Choose large (300-digits) prime numbers p and q .

Compute $n = pq$ (easy to do).

Let e be a (almost) arbitrary number.

Set $pk = (n, e)$ and $sk = (p, q, e)$.

$E_{pk}(a) = (a^e) \pmod n$ (easy when given pk).

Seemingly **hard**
to compute knowing only n ,
but not p & q .

Easy to
compute when
given n .

Easy to
compute when
given p & q .

and then

$$E_{pk}(a)^d = (a^e)^d = a^{de} = a^1 = a \pmod n$$

Finding TOWF's

Designing TOWF's / public-key encryption schemes is a **very challenging** task.

- 1976: Diffie & Hellman introduced the concept *protects security of internet*
- 1978: **First** example (RSA), by Rivest, Shamir & Adleman (actually, by Clifford Cocks (GCHQ) in 1973)
- 1985: **ElGamal** encryption scheme, and elliptic-curve **crypto**
- 1996: Lattice-based schemes ("post-quantum crypto")

Digital Signatures

ALICE



Public Board:



Owner: BOB




BOB




"signature"

```
%&X*#0@i|  
g>n&a1Y?x  
+d#&1$$Z)  
±*&IO3@V.  
.....  
.....  
.....&$Q0*  
%h=#$I&X@
```



Contract
I hereby....
.....
Bob



Digital Signatures

ALICE



Contract
I hereby....
.....
Bob

```
%&X*#0@i|  
g>n&a1Y?x  
+d&1$$Z)  
±*&IO3@v.  
.....  
...&$Q0*  
%h=#$1&x@
```



Public Board:



Owner: BOB



BOB



Digital Signatures

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Public Board:




Owner: BOB



BOB




```
%&X*#0@i|  
g>n&a1Y?x  
+d#&1$$Z)  
±*&IO3@V.  
.....  
.....  
.....&$Q0*  
%h=#$I&X@
```



Contract
I hereby....
.....
Bob

?

Contract
I hereby....
.....
Bob



Digital Signatures

ALICE



Public Board:



Owner: BOB




BOB



Properties:

Only Bob can produce a valid signature, but everybody can verify it.

%&X*
g>n&
+d#&
±*&I
.....
.....
.....
.....
%h=#




Contract
I hereby....
.....
Bob

?


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Contract
I hereby....
.....
Bob



Public Verifiability

ALICE



Public Board:




Owner: BOB



Contract
I hereby....
.....
Bob

```
%X*#08i|  
g>n&a1?x  
+d#&1($Z)  
±*&I03@V.  
.....  
...&$Q0*  
%h=#$I&E
```

JUDGE



Public Verifiability

ALICE




Public Board:




Owner: BOB



JUDGE



```
%&X*#0@i|  
g>n&a1Y?x  
+d#&1$$Z)  
±*&IO3@V.  
.....  
.....  
.....&$Q0*  
%h=#$I&X@
```



Contract
I hereby....
.....
Bob

?

=

Contract
I hereby....
.....
Bob

Internet Security

ALICE



Internet Security

ALICE



Certification authorities (CA)

Internet Security


ALICE



Certification authorities (CA)

Internet Security

ALICE



Public keys of CA's
are hard-coded into
browser

Entrust[®]
Securing Digital Identities
& Information

 **digicert**[®]

 **Symantec.**

 **Deutsche
Telekom**

Certification authorities (CA)

Final Remarks

- 📌 (Public-key) cryptography offers powerful tools
- 📌 together with good understanding of their security
- 📌 **But:**
 - applying these tools correctly is often non-trivial
 - right key-management is crucial and tricky
 - the strongest lock is useless if not used properly

